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This paper responds to a recent criticism of the empirical 
evidence of bunching of innovations. An examination of various 
long-run innovation samples shows that there is indeed very poor 
evidence of innovation waves in the time before the mid-19th 
century. Thereafter, however, two long waves of major innovations 
occur, both having a lead of approximately 10-15 years over the . 
economic long wave as identified in an earlier study. A t-test 
confirms that these waves can be clearly distinguished from 
random fluctuations. In the final section some suggestions for 
further research are outlined. 
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"... there i s  one hypothesis, now out of  fashion, tha t  I 
would l i k e  t o  back. That i s  Schumpeter's theory of bouts o f  
investment induced by major technical  discoveries. While 
the new methods are  being ins ta l led ,  there  i s  b r i s k  invest-  
ment and general prosper i ty ,  but, a f t e r  a time, an over- 
shoot i s  bound t o  occur, so t ha t  excess capacity emerges and 
br ings investment down. I should be prepared t o  bet that ,  
when the  deta i led  h i s t o r y  of the  twenty-f ive years a f te r  
1945 comes t o  be wr i t ten,  i t  w i l l  be seen t o  have had the 
character of  a boom ... whi le now there i s  a formidable 
overexpansion ..." (Joan Robinson, 1979, p. 46). 
0. Introduction: Schumpeter versus Kuznets 
In his 1939 Businegs Cyqlgg, Schumpeter argued that the 
long-run development of industrial capitalism is characterized by 
waves of accelerated and decelerated economic growth of some 50 
years each. Schumpeter distinguished three such waves: 
- first wave: "Industrial Revolution Kondratieff" with an 
upswing from 1787 to 1814 and a downswing from 1814 
to 1842: 
- second wave: "Bourgeois (or Railway) Kondratieff" with an 
upswing from 1843 to 1869 and a downswing from 1870 to 
1897; 
- third wave: "Neo-mercantilist Kondratieff" with an upswing 
from 1898 to 1924 and a downswing from 1925 onwards. 
A bold extrapolation of the above scheme would lead us to 
consider the period between the two World Wars as well as the 
1970s and 1980s as downswings of the third and fourth Kondratieff 
waves, while the 1940s up to the early 1970s would be regarded as 
the upswing phase of the fourth Kondratieff. A renewed upswing of 
the world economy would then have to be expected somewhere in the 
1990s. 
According to Schumpeter (1939), each of the above-named 
upswings can be linked to the emergence and rapid growth of new 
industrial activities, which were initiated by radical 
innovations. The subsequent downswings are due to the exhaustion 
of innovat ive growth impulses. In order to produce f luctuat ions 
which are visible in qacrg-economic data, radical innovations 
should not be randomly distributed over time but should come 
about in clusters or waves. 
In his famous review of Schumpeter's Busingsg-Cycles Kuznets 
spoke of a "host of crucial quest ions and disturbing doubts" 
(Kuznets, 1940, p. 262). His criticism referred to three topics 
in particular: firstly, Schumpeter had failed to give evidence 
that long waves are not only a price phenomenon, but also exist 
in "real" indicators of general economic activity (see ibid, p. 
267); secondly, Schumpeter's explanation of the alleged long 
waves implied some bunching of radical innovations which still 
remained to be empirically proven (see ibid, p- 263); thirdly, 
Schumpeter had also failed to give a convincing explanation of 
why such a bunching should occur (see ibid, p- 262ff.). 
In retrospect, it seems fair to admit that Kuznets has been 
essentially right on all three points of critique. As theorizing 
on long waves more or less stagnated during the 1950s and 1960s. 
the critical questions raised by Kuznets have remained 
unanswered. On the other hand, Schumpet er ' s t heoret ical 
propositions, if correct, are likely to have some obvious and 
far-reaching consequences for our understanding of long-run 
economic growth. 
In this paper I shall give particular attention to the second 
point of Kuznets' critique: Is there any evidence of a 
discontinuous occurrence of radical innovations? Kuznets' first 
point has been addressed elsewhere, leading to the conclusion 
that in a number of industrial core countries there is indeed 
evidence of a significant long wave pattern in indicators of 
general economic activity, at least during the last hundred years 
(Bieshaar and Kleinknecht 1984; see also the comment by Solomou 
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1986a and the reply by Bieshaar and Kleinknecht 1986). Moreover, 
Kuznets' point of how to explain a possible bunching of inno- 
vations has been discussed extensively in Kleinknecht (1987). The 
explanation presented there ("depression-trigger" hypothesis), 
although still being debated (see e-g. Coombs 1987), is beyond 
the scope of this papec. 
I. The Debate on Basic Innovation Clusters. 
In recent years, various attempts have been made to collect 
long-run historical innovation indicators, and particularly to 
distinguish a few radical breakthroughs in technology from the 
large stream of smaller piecemeal changes. 
To put it metaphorically: there is a real difference between 
innovators who introduce improved horse cars and those who 
abolish horse cars by introducing railways or automobiles. A 
number of imaginative notions have been introduced in order to 
describe this difference in more general terms. For example, Dosi 
( 1982 ) recommends that i nnovat ions which est abl i sh new 
"technological paradigms" be distinguished from innovations that 
occur within existing paradigms. Others speak of "basic 
innovations" versus "improvement innovations" (e.g. Mensch 1975; 
Van Duijn 1983; Haustein and Neuwirth 1982), or of "New 
Technology Systems" (Clark et dl- 1983). or "New Technological 
Webs" (Roobeek 1987), or simply of "Major" or "Radical" 
i nnovat ions. 
An early attempt by Mensch (1975) to verify the hypothesis 
that "basic innovations" occur in clusters has been received with 
scepticism (see e.g. Scholz 1976, Mansfield 1983). In their 
detailed criticism, Clark et al. (1981) pointed to serious 
problems in Mensch's data base. They refer to topics such as the 
representativeness of his data source, his selection procedure, 
and the determination of innovation years (see ibid, p. 148f). 
Their critique has triggered more intense research efforts 
on long-run innovation patterns which I have treated elsewhere 
more extensively (Kleinknecht 1987). The results of my 
examination of various independent sources of long-run innovation 
indicators eventually confirmed that Clark et al. have been right 
in criticizing the fact that the original Mensch list of "basic 
innovations" did indeed underestimate the frequency of basic 
innovations during the "early upswing" phase of the long waves. 
This implies that the discontinuity in the rate of major 
innovations does not manifest itself in narrow clusters during 
the depth of the depressions ( 1 8 8 0 ~ ~  1930s) as hypothesized by 
Mensch, but in virtual w,aves of major innovat ions. Table 1 gives 
a comparison between the original Mensch (1979) periodization of 
innovation c1uste.r~ and our dating of periods of stronger and 
weaker growth and innovation activity. The latter is restricted 
to periods from the 1860s onwards, because of the poor evidence 
of macro-economic innovation waves in early capitalism which will 
become obvious further below. 
Table 1: Periods of stronger ( + + + )  and weaker ( - - - )  performance 
economic growth according 
to Bieshaar 8 Kleinknecht 
(1984, 1986): 1873---1893+++1913---1939+++1974--- . . .  
innovation performance 
(12-years lead) accor- 
ding to Kleinknecht 
(1987) : 
innovation clusters 
according to Mensch 
(1979, p. 132): 
In view of the evidence derived from various data sets 
(including their own data), Clark et al. have meanwhile admitted 
that there might indeed exist a bunching of innovations in 
certain periods. However, they advocate a different causal 
explanation (see Clark et al. 1983, p. 74f. )(l) 
Following that line, emphasis now seems to shift towards how 
to explain the observed bunching of innovations (see e.g. the 
comment by Coombs 1987). Apart from that development, however, 
there has recently been a contribution by Solomou (1986) which 
again radically questions the empirical evidence. The next 
section will be dedicated to that critique. 
11.  The Solomou critique. 
Solomou (1986) examined samples of "basic innovations" by 
Mensch (1979) and Van Duijn (1983) as well as a sample of 
"important innovations" by Kleinknecht (1981) as derived from 
Mahdavi (1972). He concluded that these data are compatible with 
his random walk (or random shock) hypothesis rather than with a 
long wave perspective. Besides doing some statistical 
explorations which will be dealt with further below, Solomou 
makes several critical remarks on the nature of the data. These 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. in assembling data on basic innovations one is adding up 
cases of different importance; certainly, some cases 
are more "basic" than others and hence some weigthing 
procedure would be desirable. 
2. the randomness of Mensch's selection procedure may be 
doubted (see e.g. the critique by Clark et dl. 1981, p. 
148f. ) .  
3. if the argument about a relationship between market 
structure and innovation is valid, then market 
structure changes between the 19th and the 20th 
century would make any intertemporal comparison of 
innovation rates a problematic exercise. 
4. since the majority of innovation cases had its origin in 
the USA, world innovation rates should be linked to the 
alleged Kuznets-cycle pattern in American economic 
growth . 
Before responding in more detail to points 1. and 2. (which 
appear to be reasonable points of critique), a few remarks need 
to be made on points 3 -  and 4. 
As to market structure and RBD activity, the classical survey 
by Kamien and Schwartz concludes that empirical studies (being 
based on shaky data, of course) give only little support to a 
positive relationship (1983, p- 104). Moreover, "Investigation of 
the supposition that large firms have the best innovative talent 
have disclosed almost the exact opposite. The largest firms 
appear to be far less efficient innovators than smaller rivals" 
(ibid. 1 .  
But even if valid, in a long-run historical perspective, 
changes in market structure would probably have to be conceived 
as a rather continuous and irreversible process. Consequently, 
the argument could probably explain a trend increase in 
innovation rates rather than the type of wave pattern which will 
show up in our data further below ( 2 )  - except if one would argue 
that market structure changes occur in long waves (this would 
indeed be a remarkable contribution to the current long wave 
debate! 1 .  
Solomou's argument about linking world innovation rates to 
the Kuznets cycle pattern in American economic growth (point 4. ) 
is misleading in at least two respects. Firstly, there are 
reasons to believe that the Kuznets cycle is a statistical 
artefact, due to problematic filtering effects which result from 
the use of first differences in detrending economic time series 
(see Bieshaar and Kleinknecht 1986, p. 190f.I. Secondly, provided 
that the Kuznets cycle exists at all, there seems to be some 
agreement that it is restricted to the period before World War I 
(see e.g. the dicussion in Rostow 19751, while US world market 
hegemony has emerged during the 20th century only and is most 
obvious after World War 1 1 .  
While rejecting the above points 3. and 4., the first and 
second point of critique should be taken seriously. It is a 
problematic exercise to add up innovations of quite different 
importance and complexi t y, and the rate of i nnovat ion observed 
may be biased by the personal whims and preferences of the 
compiler. For example: a compiler may include cases of "basic" 
innovations which other compilers would classify as "minor" 
cases; or, a researcher may use problematic sources and 
investigate certain historical periods more carefully than other 
periods. On the other hand, trusting the personal integrity of 
researchers, one might hope that such biases (although 
unavoidable) will remain within acceptable limits. 
In the following, I shall add up the sets of innovation data 
by Mensch (1979) (3) and Van Duijn (19831, adding another set of 
basic innovation data by Haustein and Neuwirth (19921, which has 
nor been considered by Solomou (1986) .  In doing so, it is hoped 
that a possible bias from personal judgement by an individual 
compiler will be reduced. The adding up of 311 cases from the 
three samples implies some weighting procedure, since cases which 
are included in all three samples (and which can therefore most 
confidently be considered as "basic" innovations, since all three 
authors agree upon these cases) are counted three times. Cases, 
which are included in two out of the three sources (which might 
st i l l  be considered as relatively "safe" cases of basic 
innovations) are countsd twice. The catagory of basic innovations 
which are reported by one of the three sources only (and which 
are most likely to cover a number of doubtful cases) are counted 
only once- Because of the implicit weighting procedure, we would 
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expect the resulting "supersample" to give a more re1 iable 
indication of long-run innovation patterns than the isolated 
consideration of an individual source could do. Only in the 
extreme case that all three sources had exactly the same bias, 
our "supersample" would imply no improvement. The "supersample" 
is displayed in graph 1. 
Graph I: All basic innovations from 3 sources ("supersample") 
(Annual frequencies from 1803 to 1965). 
In order to get an idea about the reliability of the 
"supersample", i t  is interesting to see how far the three 
underlying sources overlap. A schematic presentation of overlaps 
is given in graph 2. It should be noted that the figures in graph 
2 may be subject to some counting errors which are due to the 
nature of the data: quite frequently, the different sources use a 
slightly different description of the same innovation case; 
besides, counting is sometimes complicated because two sources 
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may have considered a different aspect of the same type of 
innovation (9-g. one source is covering the first commercially 
successful steamship, while the other source takes the year of 
the first atlantic crossing of a steamship)- Moreover, even for 
idsntical events, often diverging innovation ysars are given 
Graph 2: Overlap between 3 samples of basic innovations (1800 - 
1968 1 
Mensch ( 1979 1 
(n=133) 
Van Du 
(1983) 
(n=158 
Haust ein 
Neuwirt h 
(1982) 
(n=170) 
and 
(fortunately, most differences in innovation ysars remain within 
the range of a few years). In spite of such problems, graph 2 may 
give at least a rough indication of the overlap between the three 
sources. 
It can be seen in graph 2 that the Mensch (1979) sample 
shows strong overlap with the other two samples, while the Van 
Duijn (1983) and the Haustein and Neuwirth (1982) samples have 
only a modsst overlap. This can be explained by the fact that the 
Mensch sample (being published earlier) has been known to Van 
Duijn and to Haustein and Neuwirth, while the latter two have 
been compiling their samples independently of each other- It is 
remarkable to see that a number of the Mensch cases have not been 
included in the samples of the other two compilers, which 
indicates that they must have examined the Mensch sample quite 
critically- 
It should be noted that when forming the "supersample", I 
deliberately did not interfere with the data, which means that no 
case was added or omitted; even in the case of diverging 
innovation years, no innovation year was changed. Besides the 
above-described supersample, other exercises were done which are 
not documented here. For example, when adding up all cases from 
the three sources and omitting those cases which are named in one 
source only, a pattern similar to that in graph 1 was obtained. 
The same holds when adding up the Van Duijn and the Haustein and 
Neuwirth cases, leaving out the Mensch cases. 
While the "supersample" certainly is an improvement as 
compared with the individual sources, it should be noted that the 
wave pattern in the time distribution of basic innovations does 
not depend on weighting. This will become clear from our test on 
the significance of differences in mean innovation rates for 
various a priori periods, which brings us to another point of the 
Solomou critique. 
Solomou is right in arguing that for testing of the 
significance of long run innovat ion patterns, a test on 
differences in means between certain a priori periods is more 
appropriate than the runs test as applied by Mensch (1979). I t  is 
also correct, that the cyclicity of innovation waves (i-e. their 
endogenously caused regular recurrence) cannot be proven by any 
quantitative test, simply because of the low number of waves 
observed (any proof of cyclicity being left to a theoretically 
convincing endogenous explanation of the turning points). As 
Solomou rightly points out, however, one can test a "weak" 
Kondratieff hypothesis, testing whether observable innovation 
patterns behave according to what one would expect from a long 
wave view (ibid, p .  102). 
In doing so, I shall apply a one-sided t-test, testing 
whether the mean number of innovations during the "+++"-periods 
in Table 1 is significantly higher than during the "---"-periods 
(and vice versa). The t-test (which is not gxactly a student t) 
is defined as follows: 
where: x and x a r e  the sample means 
1 2 
6' and 6' a r e  the  sample variances, and 
1 2 
N and N a r e  the sample slzes. 
1 2 
Because of the smaller sample sizes, the use of a t-test for 
this statistic is more cautious (giving lower levels of 
significance) than the use of a z-test (as has been done by 
Solomou, 1986, p. 108). Moreover, since the hypothesized 
direction of the differences is clearly determined, a pne=gidgd 
test will be applied. As in Solomou's test it is assumed that the 
variances during the subsequent " + + + " -  and " - - -  "-periods are not 
equal. In the case of the t-test, this assumption implies a 
considerable loss of degrees of freedom, following the "safe 
rule" as outlined in Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1977, p. 214). 
Table 2 documents the results from application of the t-test 
to the "supersample". When interpreting table 2, it should be 
noted that the main difference between my results and those by 
Solomou (1986) does not seem to be due to the use of a slightly 
different test formula, but rather to a different periodization. 
For example, Solomou applies the Mensch (cluster) periodization 
(see Table 1 above) to the Van Duijn data. Since the latter show 
a (broad) wave pattern rather than a narrow cluster pattern, it 
is not surprising that Solomou finds an almost perfect random 
walk pattern (see Solomou, 1986, p. 109). 
The t-test wa,s also applied to each of the three sources 
individually, the results being reported in table A1 of the 
Appendix. Documentation in this paper is restricted to the 
results which were achieved when handling a 12 years lead of the 
innovation wave over the economic wave as hypothesized in table 
1. In order to test the robustness of the results with regard to 
slight variations in lead times, a 10 and a 15 years lead w,as 
also tried. The results differed only slightly, so that the same 
conclusions could have been drawn, using a slightly different 
periodization. Table 2 confirms that the fluctuations observed in 
figure 1 can clearly be distinguished from statistical random 
f 1 uctuat i ons . 
Table 2: T-test calculations for a priori periods of stronger and 
weaker innovation performance: the "supersample". 
Period: Means: SD: SE : t-values d-f. prob. 
In interpreting table 2, one has of course to be aware, that 
even if our weighting procedure does imply some improvement, it 
certainly cannot satisfy all possible objections uttered by 
sceptics. As has already been indicated above, nobody who has 
ever been working in the field of innovations research, needs to 
be reminded of the numerous problems concerning topics such as 
the representativeness of sources, the randomness of selection 
principles, the distinction between "major" and "minor" events, 
an appropriate sample size, or the determination of innovation 
years. 
If, in spite of all these problems, we want to arrive at a 
somewhat save judgement about Schumpeter's above-sketched 
hypothesis, we should compare evidence from as many sources as 
possible. Fortunately, due to the painstaking work by Baker 
( 1 9 7 6 > ,  there is still another long-run technology indicator 
which has been collected independently of the above basic innova- 
tion sources, and which will be considered in the following. 
I I I. Test i ng the Baker data 
While the above data on "basic innovations" consist of years 
when the first successful commercialization of new products or 
processes, perceived to be of fundamental importance, occured, 
Baker (1976) collected about 1000 "breakthrough" patents which 
refer to 363 important items (the latter ranging, in alphabetical 
sequence, from the addressograph up to the zip fastener). It 
should be mentioned that the basic innovation data are in 
principle world innovation data, whereas Baker's breakthrough 
patents are mainly patents registered at the British Patent 
Office. It can nonetheless be argued that they might be taken as 
a world innovation indicator, since "The United Kingdom's role in 
the international world of commerce has been of sufficient 
importance throughout the history of the patent system to ensure 
that most inventions of significance would have been subject of 
patent applications in this country" (Baker 1976, p. 21). 
As compared with "direct" innovation data, the Baker patent 
data have three notable drawbacks. Firstly, the year of 
publication of a breakthrough patent on a new item is not 
necessarily identical with the year of the innovation (i.e. the 
first successful commercialization of the item), although it 
should come reasonably close to it. Secondly, the Baker sample 
covers a certain number of key patents which are related to 
radical inventip~g rather than iqfipyations. Thirdly, a few cases 
are related to jmprovemenf rather than to "basic" innovations 
(see also the discussion in Kleinknecht 1987). 
These points are likely to constitute a bias in favour of a 
random walk pattern. Consequently, we would expect fluctuations, 
as hypothesized in Table 1 ,  to be less accentuated in the Baker 
data than in "pure" innovation data. A comparison between the 
Baker data in graph 3 and the "supersample" of basic innovations 
in graph 1 seems to confirm this (4). Nonetheless, the results 
Graph 3: Product-related breakthrough patents from Baker (19761, 
according to classification in Kleinknecht (1987). 
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from application of the above-defined t-te,st to the Baker data, 
being documented in Table 3, confirms that the hypothesized 
fluctuations are still significant, even though significance 
levels are generally a bit lower than in Table 2. 
PromTables 2 and 3, as well as from the test on the 
individual sources in Table A1 (appendix), it can be concluded 
that between 1881 and 1962 there is evidence of three successive 
periods of higher and lower average rates of innovations, the 
differences being distinguished from random variations at high 
Table 3: T-test calculations for a priori periods of stronger and 
weaker innovation performance: the Baker data. 
Period: mean: SD: SE : t-value d.f- prob. 
levels of significance. Judging from the (somewhat more reliable) 
"supersample" in Table 2, this holds even for the period from 
1861 to 1968. 
As to the very last period (1962-68). it is of course right 
that it is often only in retrospect with a certain time-lag that 
one can decide what are "major" innovations or "minor" ones. 
Hence, the result from Table 2 can be taken only as a very 
preliminary indication of a decline of innovation rates during 
the 1960s. Nonetheless, judging from conventional wisdom, it does 
not seem to be too bold a prognosis that the 1960s and 1970s will 
eventually turn out to have been a period of poor innovation 
performance, followed by a renewed upsurge of radical innovations 
in the 1980s and 1990s. This would also be a logical implication 
of my theoretical explanation of innovation waves which is beyond 
the scope of this paper (see Kleinknecht 1987 for an extensive 
discussion). 
Although a theoretical explanation is important for the 
issue of cyclicity of the observed waves, this paper is 
restricted to the statistical evidence which has been questionned 
by Solomou (1986). Summarizing the above considerations, we can 
say that Solomou, being right in his critique of Mensch's cluster 
hypothesis (and its statistical support), draws the wrong 
conclusions. Innovation flows have qpt  been constant. Besides a 
20th century wave of radical innovations, there is evidence of a 
period of accelerated innovation activity in the 1880s and 1890s, 
followed by a deceleration up to the late 1920s, which Solomou 
will not be able to explain by whatever exogenous shock event. 
Solomou's random walk hypothesis may hold, however, for the 
period of early capital ism. Optical inspect ion of the various 
time series suggests that, up to the mid-19th century, the flow 
of innovations in sggregaas data experienced only a monotonous 
increase. This suggests that Schumpeter's innovation-long wave 
hypothesis as a macro-economic phenomenon (5) is valid only for 
b y e l p e e d  capitalism. 
V I . Suggest ions for further research 
This paper was restricted to empirical evidence of long 
waves in the incidence of major innovations, which is of course 
closely related to the issue of long waves in economic life. The 
explanation of innovation waves which has been put forward in 
Kleinknecht (1986, 1987) has been discussed controversially. 
"Alternative" explanations, however, which stress the importance 
of "science push" and "institutional change" (Clark et al- 1983, 
Coombs 19871, or which focus on the "social structure of 
accumulat ion" (Gordon et a1 . 1982) are not necessarily 
inconsistent with my argument that a restructuring of the 
technological base of capital accumulation is triggered by a 
prolonged depression. An explanation which integrates the various 
views would, however, be a task for another paper. 
To link innovation waves to long-run profit rates would be 
another interesting issue. The idea of long waves in aggregate 
profit rates has recently been advocated by several theorists, 
e.g. Boccara (1983). Pontvieille (19851, Menshikov and Klimenko 
(1Y95), Poletayev (19851, or Reati (1996). In a disaggregated 
analysis of West German manufacturing profit rates from 1950 to 
1977, I have argued that sectors which can be closely related to 
the 20th century wave of major innovations did have a 
counteracting influence on a rapid fall of the aggregate profit 
rate during the 1950s, and in part during the 1960s (Kleinknecht 
1Y87a). Should such an analysis be done for other countries and 
periods (and, if possible, at a finer level of aggregation), a 
new light might be shed on the discussion of the Marxian "law" of 
the falling tendency of the profit rate. 
Interpreting the innovation waves from the viewpoint of 
demand theory may be another research topic, which is likely to 
be particularly attractive to Keynesian economists. In explaining 
why innovation waves may cause waves of expansion and contraction 
in the economy, one would have to consider that launching an 
innovation involves considerable investment in RBD, know how and 
eventually the build-up of production facilities; the powerful 
multiplier effects which result from such investments may be 
conceived as a positive function of the degree of radicalness of 
an innovation, the number and impact of subsequent (major and/or 
minor) innovations, and the degree of market success (diffusion). 
Of course, the boom created by such innovation multipliers 
(which may end in an overshooting such as described in the above 
quotat ion by Joan Robinson) st i 1 1  needs to be adequately 
model led. 
The relationship between demand and innovation still has 
another implication. To the extend that the "demand-pull" 
hypothesis (which is not necessarily inconsistent with my 
"depression-trigger" hypothesis) is valid in explaining 
innovation, it has an impact on government demand management 
which has been largely neglected even by Keynesian economists. 
Government demand, besides having the multiplier effects which 
are well-known from the textbooks, may influence the flow of 
innovations (and in doing so create extra demand by means of the 
above-mentioned "innovation multiplier"). Of course, from a 
Schumpeterian viewpoint, one would not advocate macro-economic 
demand impulses. The latter may be (in part) even counter- 
productive in that they (also) contribute to preserve existing 
product lines. Rather one would advocate gpecifjc demand impulses 
which are directed towards assisting the emergence of new 
industrial activities; i.e. government demand may systematically 
increase the chances of new technological options to survive in 
the process of Darwinian selection on the market place. Such a 
demand policy would have the advantage of not only increasing 
effective demand as such, but also of allowing to make political 
choices concerning socially desirable new technologies. 
The above-sketched arguments may indicate that the 
hypothesis of innovation waves, if correct, calls for a lot of 
research work still to be done. 
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Notes : 
( 1 )  Discussing innovation data on the 20th century chemical 
industry, they conclude: "All of this supports the notion of 
bunches of basic inventions and innovations leading to the take- 
off of new industries, . . .  It does not, however, demonstrate any 
direct connection between this process and the 'trigger' of 
depression" (Clark et dl. 1983, p. 74f. ) .  
(2) A similar argument is likely to apply with respect to other 
long-run structural changes, such as e-g. the rise of the 
professional RBD lab during the 20th century. 
(3) For the 20th century I took the flensch data as revised by 
Clark et al. (1983, p. 68f). 
(4) It should be mentioned that the Baker data in graph 3 and 
table 3 refer to p~pdmct-related breakthrough patents. The 
p~p~gpg-related patents show a different pattern. A detai led 
discussion and documentation of the classification of the Baker 
cases by product versus process patents can be found in 
Kleinknecht (1987, ch. 4 ) .  
(5) Recent work at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis at Laxenburg suggests that the diffusion paths 
of specific technologies (e.g. in the energy and transportation 
sector or in the steel industry) seem to fit into the framework 
of Kondratieff long waves, even during those periods in the 18th 
and 19th century for which evidence of masgo-economic long waves 
appears to be poor; see e.g. flarchetti (19861, Nakicenovic 
(1986). or ~ruebler and Nakicenovic (1987). 
APPEND1 X 
Table Al: T-test calculations for upswings and downswings of long 
waves. 
a) Basic innovations according to Van Duijn (1983) 
Periods : mean: SD: SE : t-value ' d.f. prob- 
b) Basic innovations according to Haustein and Neuwirth (1982) 
Periods: mean: SD: SE : t -value d.f. prob. 
1861-1881: 0.8571 8.9102 
0.4208 2.149 20 0 . 022 
1881-1901 : 1 - 7619 1.7001 
0.4042 2.343 20 0.015 
1901-1927: 0.8148 0.8337 
0.2873 2.191 26 0.015 
1927-1962: 1.4444 1.3404 
0.4008 0.428 10 insignif. 
1962-1972: 1.2727 1.1037 
C) Mensch's 20th century basic innovations as revised by Clark et 
al. (1983) 
Periods : mean: SD: SE : t-value d-f. prob. 
